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PROLOGUE
Here is a too-easy torts final exam question:
An aircraft, negligently maintained by its operator, crashes on takeoff. The operator and
sole passenger is killed. In addition, the plane strikes and causes $250,000 of damage to a zoo
that is a local tourist attraction). For which of the following is the operator's estate liable in tort?
•

The amounts claimed by eligible persons for the "Wrongful Death" of the
passenger;

•

The damage to the zoo;

•

The cost of a babysitter hired by the sister of the passenger, to care for the
sister's toddler while the sister attends the passenger's funeral;

•

The loss (represented by the time value of money for the period between the
untimely accident and the passenger's actuarial life span) to the insurance
company that paid the proceeds of the passenger's life insurance policy to its
designated beneficiaries;

•

The cost of overtime pay by the County to the police officers it directed to
control traffic around the crash scene;

•

The interest costs borne by the factory worker who had to borrow money after
being laid off when the factory that had employed him shut down. The
factory had shut down because it could no longer afford to pay increased
property taxes, which the city had imposed to compensate for the loss of other
tax revenue resulting from the decline in tourism that followed the closure of
the zoo.
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If you answered that the negligent aircraft operator is liable for all these damages, stop.
Return to the classroom. Do not collect your Law degree – for clearly, you missed the "duty,"
"causation" and "damages" segments of your Torts course.2

I.

INTRODUCTION
On October 30, 1998, New Orleans became the first city in the nation to file suit against

the firearm industry.3 Chicago followed two weeks later.4 Within a year, twenty-nine cities and
counties had sued over forty gun manufacturers, dealers and trade associations. Most of these
plaintiffs contend that the defendants' firearms are "defective and unreasonably dangerous"
products as then manufactured and marketed. The governments demanded damages for harms
allegedly caused by those defective and unreasonably dangerous products. So far, so good: this
claim, however persuasive, at least respects the basic principles of product liability law.5

It

alleges that the manufacturers acted wrongfully,6 and it demands compensation for harm
proximately caused by this wrongdoing.
Alas, the prima facie validity of the firearm suits ends here, for governments are not
claiming that their property was destroyed or damaged by exploding, defective guns. Rather, the
gist of these suits is a demand for recovery of costs that plaintiffs incurred to treat uninsured gunshot victims in city hospitals; to pay for police and 911 employees' overtime; to compensate for
2

Only the first two types of damage are recoverable in tort. The third type of damage is excluded if the sister is not
named in the state's Wrongful Death Statute.
3
Morial v. Smith & Wesson, et al., No. 98-18578 (New Orleans Parish Ct).
4
Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., et al., No. 98-CH-015596 (Cook County Circuit Court, Chancery Div.).
5
McPherson v. Buick, 217 N.Y 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
6
This article accepts, without discussing or in any way relying on, the position that product liability is based on
wrongful behavior, even though most courts purport to base it on strict liability. See, e.g., William C. Powers, Jr.,
The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61 TEX. L. REV. 777, 779 (1983) (“[T]he concept of fault is
embedded in the structure of strict products liability law itself.”).
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lost tax revenue as property values dropped in violence-infested neighborhoods; and the like.7 As
has been documented elsewhere, these suits have been almost universally unsuccessful,8 for they
rebuff three conditions of a valid tort suit: they fail to prove breach of a duty of care, they fail to
establish proximate causation and they invoke non-cognizable damages.9
Some who would hold firearms manufacturers liable for expenses incurred by
governments after the criminal use of guns take issue with the claim that the government services
for which compensation is claimed are "free", and therefore ineligible for tort recovery. They
argue that government services should not "subsidize" tortfeasors, and that proper accounting
requires tortfeasors to "internalize" social costs of their alleged misbehavior.10 They would do
away with what they term the "free public services doctrine"11 (”FPSD”), which one author
described as holding that “a governmental entity may not recover from a tortfeasor the costs of
public services occasioned by the tortfeasor’s wrong.”12 Why should taxpayers pay to direct
traffic after a collision caused by a drunk driver? Why should the drunk (and his insurance
company) not be charged the cost of the public ambulance used to transport victims to the

7

The suit by Bridgeport, Connecticut adds a claim that gun manufacturers have violated federally protected civil
rights because shootings take place in “predominantly minority neighborhoods.” Eighty percent of homicide victims
in Bridgeport are in fact members of “minority groups.” Bridgeport does not mention that 90 percent of homicide
defendants are also minority group members.
8
One suit has thus far survived summary judgment. The court in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. held that
“a public-nuisance action can be maintained for injuries caused by a product if the facts establish that the design,
manufacturing, marketing, or sale of the product unreasonably interferes with a right common to the general public.
768 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (Ohio 2002). The case has not yet gone back to the trial court
9
Michael I. Krauss, Fire and Smoke: Government Lawsuits and the Rule of Law (2000).
10
See, e.g., Timothy D. Lytton, Should Government Be Allowed to Recover the Costs of Public Services from
Tortfeasors? Tort Subsidies, the Limits of Loss Spreading, and the Free Public Services Doctrine, 76 TUL. L. REV.
727 (2002) [hereinafter Lytton]. See also David C. McIntyre, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response Costs:
Accounting for the True Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1001 (1987); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Risks
of and Reactions to Underterrence in Torts, 70 MO. L. REV. 691 (2005); Laura L. Gavioli, Who Should Pay:
Obstacles to Cities in Using Affirmative Litigation as a Source of Revenue, 78 TUL. L. REV. 941 (2004); Thomas C.
Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019 (2001);
Raymond E. Gangarosa et al., Suits by Public Hospitals to Recover Expenditures for the Treatment of Disease,
Injury and Disability Caused by Tobacco and Alcohol, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 81 (1994).
11
Lytton, supra note 10, at 727.
12
Id.
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hospital, or the fire engine used to douse the flames created by the drunk's car's collision with a
gas pump?13 Why should the drunk be able to "externalize" all this harm?
It is obvious to advocates of cost recoupment suits against gun manufacturers that the
stakes in the FPSD debate are high. One critic has recently edited a collection of articles on
“Suing the Gun Industry,” in which he again asserts that FPSD is a “confusion” that should be
excised from the common law of tort.14 On the other side of the political spectrum, proponents
of federal “tort reform” have sought to specifically immunize gun manufacturers from
recoupment suits.15 Of course such legislation, if enacted, would imply that the recoupment suits
might have been valid in common law in the statute's absence.16
This article contends that both camps would benefit from a thorough understanding of the
Free Public Services Doctrine’s place within the common law of tort. According to an FPSD
critic, for instance, only ten states and a few federal courts follow FPSD.17 But as the Prologue's
"exam question" suggests, FPSD is in reality an illustration of universal and fundamental

13

See, e.g., Kelly J. Winding, Miscellaneous, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, August 11, 1999, at E7 (reporting that
the Pittsburgh city council voted to adopt an ordinance permitting service companies and borough officials to recoup
fire, police, and emergency services from reckless people who cause accidents, including drunk drivers); Keith
Stone, Conference Airs ‘Bright Ideas’ for a Better L.A., DAILY NEWS OF L.A., Nov. 17, 1996, at N3 (reporting that
an attorney argued at a conference that Los Angeles should charge drunk drivers for the time and expense of their
cases, so that the city can recoup some of its costs).
14
Timothy D. Lytton, Suing the Gun Industry: A Battle at the Crossroads of Gun Control and Mass Torts 14-15
(Timothy Lytton ed. 2005).
15
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, H.R. 1036, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 659, 108th Cong. (2003) (“To
prohibit civil liability actions from being brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or
importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from the misuse of their products by others”).
16
A statute that is comprehensive indicates a legislative intent that the statute totally supersedes and replaces the
common law dealing with the subject matter. NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 50:5 (6th ed. 2005); see also Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 789 (1952) (holding that a
comprehensive statute describing course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations, and exceptions excludes all
aspects of the common law not specified by Congress in the statute).
17
Lytton cites cases for the following states: Alaska, California, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Lytton, supra note 10, at 728-29 n.2. He also discusses what he
deems the “mixed” acceptance of the doctrine in federal courts.
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common law tort concepts: duty, proximate cause and damages. Wherever these elements remain
requirements for common law liability, public service cost recoupment should be denied.18
Abolishing FPSD could result in government recovery of the cost of many services it
currently provides – from firefighting costs due to careless smokers to special education required
by children born with preventable medical problems.19 As this article shows, FPSD’s opponents
unjustifiably confine their recoupment demands to expenditures made where the target defendant
is a corporation. Their proposed modification of the free public services doctrine is, this article
contends, in reality a means to further their agenda of "regulation by litigation."20
FPSD’s opponents find the justifications offered in defense of the doctrine to be weak
and circular.21 They challenge FPSD as unfair22 and inefficient23, and claim that FPSD springs
from "judicial activism" that distorts common law and usurps legislatures’ policy-making

18

This is why the list of jurisdictions that do not accept FPSD is far more extensive than the list of jurisdictions that
actually mention the doctrine by name. For example, proximate cause was invoked in Georgia in Torres v. Putnam
County, 541 S.E.2d 133, 136 & n.4 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (dismissing suit against defendants for the cost of sending
county building inspector, sheriff, and deputy sheriff to inspect defendants’ land for zoning violations). See also
City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, 801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003); 2003 Ind. LEXIS 1096, *40 (noting that the
doctrines of remoteness and proximate cause may apply to the city’s public nuisance claim against a firearm
manufacturer). Lytton discusses why he believes proximate cause analysis is often different from the free public
services doctrine at in Lytton, supra note 10, at 748-49.
19
For an example of the expense of special education, see BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 159 (Berkley Books 1988)
(estimating cost of special education for brain-damaged child as $47,748 a year for 16 years).
20
Lytton, for example, has written extensively elsewhere in favor of the use of municipal and individual suits
against gun manufacturers and dealers as a way to augment government regulation of the industry. Timothy D.
Lytton, The Complementary Role of Tort Litigation in Regulating the Gun Industry, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A
BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 250 (Timothy D. Lytton ed. 2005); Timothy D.
Lytton, Lawsuits Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247 (2000);
Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role
for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 65 MO. L. REV. 1 (2000); Timothy D. Lytton, Negligent
Marketing: Halberstam v. Daniel and the Uncertain Future of Negligent Marketing Claims Against Firearms
Manufacturers, 64 BROOKLYN L. REV. 681 (1998). Galligan approves of recoupment suits against firearms and
tobacco manufacturers because they will "equalize the relative strength of the parties. The suit is one powerful
entity – a governmental entity – against another, a large entity or group of entities. [I]t is large versus large." Supra,
note 10. at 1049
21
See, e.g., Lytton, supra note 10, at 752 (“The few opinions that give justifications provide little more than merely
the outlines of an adequate defense of [FPSD], and they suffer from question-begging . . . . [S]urveying the case
law reveals that in imposing the doctrine, courts have failed to offer any convincing justification for it.”).
22
Id. at 759.
23
Id. at 765.
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prerogatives. If these critics are correct, trial attorneys and judicial and economic conservatives
should unite to condemn FPSD.24
Contrary to this view, however, this article argues that the free public services doctrine
does not distort tort law. FPSD is in fact an embodiment of the common law of torts; it is ridding
tort of FPSD that would be legislating from the bench. Abolishing FPSD inside the common law
would require defiling fundamental tort doctrines. Deploying governmental rescue services to
mitigate the effects of misbehavior does not constitute “damages” proximately caused by that
misbehavior. No one owes a duty to governments to refrain from utilizing government services,
except conceivably to refrain from maliciously calling upon them.25

Therefore any alleged

overuse is not damage proximately caused by wrongdoing.
This article defends FPSD by describing four flaws that undermine the anti-FPSD thesis.
Part II details FPSD critics' most blatant failing, a defective analysis of current law. This faulty
analysis leads FPSD’s critics to suggest a reform that would in fact render tort law incoherent.
Part III discusses FPSD critics’ failure to acknowledge why government services are "free." This
Part also rebuts two of the critics' claims: that FPSD under-deters corporations from committing
negligent acts, and that FPSD is an instance of judicial activism. Part IV broaches an issue that
permeates the FPSD critique: a pervasive distrust of corporations. The Conclusion summarizes

24

Id. at 740.
Thus, prank false-alarm phone calls to the fire department would arguably be fraudulent and tortious under
common law. Courts have allowed suits by emergency workers injured in accidents on the way to answer
emergency calls that are later found to be false alarms. See, e.g., Duncan v. Rzonca, 478 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) (city police officer injured on way to answer silent robbery alarm at bank set off by negligently supervised
child); Daas v. Pearson, 319 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1971) (city police officer injured on way to answer
intentional false alarm). There is no obvious reason why municipalities could not similarly recover from plaintiffs
for damage to city vehicles involved in such accidents. Further, many municipalities make it a crime to falsely
summon emergency workers. Such statutes may be used to aid in determining the standard of care required of
citizens. E.g., Daas, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 540-41.

25
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the claim that FPSD must be retained as an essential component of the common law of tort,
unless and until tort is superseded by public ordering.26

II.

FPSD AND TORT DOCTRINE
Tort liability for negligence requires that a plaintiff allege, and produce persuasive

evidence of: (a) the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff; (b) the defendant's breach of this duty; (c)
the proximate and legal causation of the plaintiff’s loss from this breach; and (d) the cognizable
damages arising from this loss.27 A compelling case can be made that tortfeasors do not owe
any legal duty to the providers of government services. Likewise, the discharge of government
services does not constitute proximately caused compensable damages. FPSD, it turns out, does
little more than give a name to an instantiation of basic doctrines of tort.

A.

Duty

In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,28 the California Court of Appeal

explained the common law doctrine of duty in this way:
Whether intentional or negligent, a tort “involves a violation of a legal duty,
imposed by statute, contract or otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person
injured. Without such a duty, any injury is ‘damnum absque injuria’ -- injury
without wrong.” . . .29

26

See Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, 35 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 623 (1992).
PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 30, p.164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
28
223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
29
Id. at 855 (citations omitted).
27
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The California court in Abalone was commenting on legal duty generally, not in specific
relation to FPSD.30 But "duty analysis" is "duty analysis", and applies fully even when used to
deny tortfeasor liability for a byproduct of a free public rescue service. This has classically been
the case under the “firefighter’s rule.” Dating back to 1892, the firefighter’s rule31 precludes
recovery in tort from a negligent landowner by a rescue worker injured while attending to the
emergency created by the landowner's negligence.32 The original rationale for this rule against
recovery was arguably based on property law,33 but today the firefighter’s rule is often seen as
one of the surviving instances of the doctrine of assumption of risk.34 Like FPSD, the
firefighter’s rule is said to bar recovery due to the lack of any duty owed to the firefighter by the
person who negligently caused the blaze. To the contrary, the proximate cause of the
firefighter's injury was the firefighter's own voluntarily decision to do her job.
The similarity between the firefighter's rule and FPSD can be seen in. Mayor & Council
of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc.,, where both played a role.35 Two corporations were
allegedly responsible for an explosion and ensuing fire at a fuel plant in Morgan City, Louisiana.
The city sued both corporations to recoup the cost of fighting the fire. In affirming the lower
court’s denial of recovery, the Louisiana Court of Appeal stated: “We deem it unreasonable to
hold that an owner owes it to firefighters not to let his building catch fire. To the contrary: it is
the firefighters’ duty to the property owners (and neighbors) to save them from their
30

The court did, however, discuss the doctrine at 850-51. After discussing Flagstaff and Air Florida, the court held
that “a government entity may not, as the County seeks to do in this case, recover the costs of law enforcement
absent authorizing legislation.” Thereafter, the court determined that there was no statute authorizing such recovery.
Id. at 851-53.
31
The rule also applies to police officers. See David L. Strauss, Comment, Where There’s Smoke There’s the
Firefighter’s Rule: Containing the Conflagration After One Hundred Years, 1992 WISC. L. REV. 2031, 2031 (1992).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 2034. Courts originally considered firemen’s liability under the traditional categories of entrants upon land - invitees, licensees, and trespassers. Firefighters were licensees, not subject to the more strenuous duties owed to
invitees.
34
Id. at 2035.
35
Mayor & Council of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
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negligence.”36 The court continued: “By assuming the responsibility of providing for such
‘rescue’ services, the City has placed itself in a situation analogous to that of the professional
rescuer.”37
As Fontenot demonstrates, government's duty to provide rescue services without later
suing for compensation, and negligent citizens' lack of duty to refrain from non-maliciously
using government services, are two sides of he same coin. Professors Lytton and Galligan
dispute the relevance of this duty analysis to FPSD, however. Galligan writes,
"The argument that public entities exist to provide public services is a confusing
response.

So what?

Public servies traceable to a defendant's torts ought to be

recoverable in order to encourage efficient investments in safety."38

Lytton, writing in a Louisiana journal, excoriates Fontenot as question-begging:
According to the court, the government cannot recover the costs of public service
expenditures from tortfeasors because tortfeasors owe the government no duty of
care to prevent such losses. Tortfeasors owe no duty because the government,
like a professional rescuer, assumes the risk of losses incurred while providing
services to tort victims. The government can be said to assume the risk because
such losses are inherent in the government’s duty to provide public services. That
is, the government is under a duty to provide public services free of charge. Thus,
the government cannot recover the costs of public services from tortfeasors
because they are under a duty to provide such services free of charge. The
Fontenot court’s duty analysis ultimately amounts to a restatement, rather than a
justification, of the free public services doctrine: the government cannot recover
public service costs from tortfeasors because it is under a duty not to.39
36

Id. at 687 (quoting Thompson v. Warehouse Corp. of America, 337 So. 2d 572, 573 (La. App. 1976)) (emphasis
added).
37
Id. at 688.
38
Galligan, supra note 10, at 1045-6
39
Id. at 754.
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It is of course correct to assert that common law courts normally repeat fundamental rules
rather than offer independent philosophical groundings for them. This is known as applying
established precedent. Applying pre-existing rules is only “question-begging” in the sense that
the Rule of Law is question-begging – the invocation of a precedent assumes the legitimacy of a
legal rule instead of constantly re-establishing it.40
Consider the substantive question, then. The common law precludes recovery for free
public service expenses; but why is this the case? Are governments precluded from recovering
because their expenses were in fulfillment of their own duty to provide rescue services? Is
recovery precluded because the tortfeasor owes no duty to the government providing the service?
Is this a distinction without a difference? Are these two ways of phrasing the same idea?

(1) Government’s Duty to Rescue
In 1987, FPSD opponent David McIntyre discussed the importance of "duty" in FPSD.41
In McIntyre’s opinion, the “primary rationale” behind the general rule against municipal cost
recovery is the assertion of a self-imposed “pre-existing duty of government to act.”42Courts
have held that recovery of the costs of rescue from a negligent corporation whose tort led to an
increase in such costs is precluded because government fulfilled a “governmental function” by
providing rescue services. In effect, governments assign themselves "duties to rescue" according

40

Indeed, Lytton presents his own question-begging argument: governments should recoup public services from
corporations because . . . well, because Lytton thinks they should.
41
See McIntyre, supra note 10.
42
Id. at 1009. Courts have held that there is no positive constitutional right to government-supplied rescue services.
Governments are free to decline to provide such services. See, e.g., Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th
Cir. 1988) (holding city’s failure to send an emergency squad to a resident in physical distress who called for help
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of Equal Protection and Due Process); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (stating, “As a general matter, the State is under no constitutional duty to provide
substantive services for those within its border.”).
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to the services they have established. It is a government’s statutory self-imposition of this
responsibility, not the tortfeasor’s common law duty to his direct victim, that is the legal source
of costs incurred by the state. Such was the holding in City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A.
Corp.,43 where the Ohio Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that “the city
may not recover for expenditures for ordinary public services which [sic] it has the duty to
provide.”44 Similarly, in 2001 the Connecticut Supreme Court upheld a 1999 ruling dismissing
the City of Bridgeport’s suit against firearm manufacturers, because the city, having provided
public services as part of its normal civic function, lacked “any statutory authorization to initiate
. . . claims” of liability against the firearms industry.45

(2)

Tortfeasor’s Lack of Duty to Government
Courts have likewise rejected government attempts to recover the cost of public service

occasioned by a tortfeasor’s negligence on the grounds that the tortfeasor owed no pre-existing
legal duty to government. In Fontenot, the city spent $38,000 on fire and police services to
extinguish the fire.46 The court denied the city recovery for the cost of these services, declaring
that any duty Fontenot, Inc. owed in handling its flammable chemicals “does not include within
the ambit of its protection the risk that public … funds will be expended to fight a fire . . . .”47
The defendant airline in District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., a case examined below,

43

Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *1 (Oh. Ct. App. 2000), reversed and
remanded, 768 N.E.2d 1136. The Ohio Supreme Court, on remand, confirmed that as a general rule “a municipality
cannot reasonably expect to recover the costs of services whenever a tortfeasor causes harm to the public. . . .” 768
N.E.2d at 1149.
44
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601, at *38.
45
Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313 (Conn. 2001), aff’g 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1999).
46
460 So. 2d 685, 686 (La. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
47
Id. at 688.
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successfully made a similar argument at trial: it did not owe a “duty of due care to protect the
District [of Columbia] from the expense of providing emergency services.”48
A duty to government was arguably breached in New York v. Long Island Lighting Co.49
where a county court nonetheless dismissed a state’s action to recover labor and equipment costs
incurred to divert traffic from a road onto which the defendant’s power lines had (allegedly
negligently) fallen.50 The state’s own property had been obstructed as a result of the allegedly
wrongful behavior, making the government's tort case stronger than for the firearm suits.
Notwithstanding this distinction, the court dismissed the recoupment suit on these grounds:
“The plaintiff may not recover damages for undertaking its duty to ensure the safety of the
traveling public . . . . Plaintiffs performed the very tasks intended by the Legislature. They
exercised . . . functions, powers and duties relating to traffic regulation and control.”51
The source of the plaintiff's expenditures was its voluntarily assumed statutory duty to ensure the
flow of traffic, not the damage to its own property by the defendant.
In County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance,52 a county sued to recover money
spent for police overtime and related costs arising from protest groups’ occupation of a
construction site for a nuclear power plant.53 The defendants intentionally (though not
maliciously) committed acts of trespass that they in fact hoped would result in the expenditure of
police resources; yet even they were not held liable for those expenditures. A fortiori must this
be the case when a public expenditure is neither foreseen or desired. Hiking alone on the
Appalachian Trail in the wintertime may be foolhardy, and even a dereliction of one's duty to
48

District of Columbia v Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See infra, note 103 and accompanying
text.
49
493 N.Y.S.2d 255 (N.Y. Nassau Co. Ct. 1985). Cited by Lytton, supra note 10, at 729 n.2. & 769 n.192.
50
Long Island Lighting, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
51
Id. at 257.
52
223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
53
Id. at 857.
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one's dependents and employer, but it is assuredly not a legal breach of any common law duty to
the Park Service's mountain rescue squad.
District of Columbia v. Air Florida,54 involved a jet that crashed into Washington’s 14th
Street Bridge on takeoff from National Airport. The District of Columbia sued the airline to
recover expenditures for overtime pay and for equipment used to rescue the injured, recover the
bodies of the dead, and raise the wreckage of the plane.55 Air Florida certainly owed a duty to its
passengers,and to persons on the ground, not to negligently injure them or damage their
property. Thus, the airline owed a duty to the District of Columbia not to negligently damage the
14th Street Bridge. However, the airline owed no duty to the D.C. Fire Department to refrain
from prompting use of its emergency services– rather, it is DCFD that created and assumed the
duty (which did not exist at common law) to help Air Florida and others similarly stricken.
Recovery is generally permitted for damage to government property arising from a tortfeasor’s
negligence, even though recoupment is not allowed for rescue and cleanup efforts.56 Air Florida
followed this pattern; the airline agreed to pay the District for damage to the bridge,57 but the
city’s lawsuit against the airline for recovery of the cost of rescue services was dismissed.58

(3)

Subrogatory Theory of Duty
In an effort to forestall the duty-based assessment of the common law, McIntyre posits an

agency theory that bypassed the traditional notion of duty. He writes, “in a disaster situation a
duty of reasonable care is owed the public at large which, in essence, is represented by the

54

750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1079.
56
Lytton discusses the exception for damage to public property at Lytton, supra note 10, at 743. McIntyre discusses
the exception at McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1025.
57
750 F.2d at 1079 n.1.
58
The United States District Court (D.C.) dismissed the city's suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted, and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1078.
55
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government plaintiff in a response cost recovery action.”59 Similarly, “there is no reason why a
municipality’s financial interests should not be entitled to legal protection, particularly since it is
suing on behalf of its taxpayers, to whom the money ultimately belongs.”60 Lytton uncritically
paraphrases McIntyre's arguments: “Taxpayers lose when they pay to replenish public resources
depleted by the tortfeasor, and the public at large loses whenever those resources are no longer
available for other purposes. In this regard, government is analogous to a corporation, whose
losses ultimately harm shareholders.”61
In this view, provision of government services is analogous to insurers' indemnification
of insureds, allowing insurers de jure subrogation against the party that injured their insureds in
some cases. There are two problems with this argument, however. First, subrogation requires
that the party suing stand in the shoes of the actual victim.62 Subrogation may be invoked only if
the direct victim herself has a legal claim against the tortfeasor, which the victim (or the law) can
assign to the “insurer” (here, the government).63 This is a questionable proposition in the case of
disaster responses.64 Second, if citizens did have individual causes of action against a tortfeasor,

59

McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1020. Note that Luschei analyses City of Flagstaff under a similar approach, arguing
that the city government should have been compensated (although under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than
in tort) for assuming the railroad's duty to rescue residents put in danger by the railroad's dangerous chemicals. See
Luschei, infra note 82 at 984.
60
Id. at 1011. (our emphasis)
61
Lytton, supra note 10, at 760. Presumably Lytton is only concerned with corporate tortfeasors, for reasons made
clear infra.
62
See, e.g., Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Courtaulds Performance Films, Inc., 580 S.E.2d 812, 815 (Va. 2003)
("Subrogation is, in its simplest terms, the substitution of one part in the place of another with reference to a lawful
claim, demand, or right so that the party that is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other."); Federal Land Bank
of Baltimore v. Joynes, 18 S.E.2d 917, 920 (Va. 1942) ("Subrogation is the substitution of another person in the
place of the creditor to whose rights he succeeds in relation to the debt."); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Whaley, 3
S.E.2d 395 (Va. 1939) (In equity, a debt paid by a surety "is treated as still subsisting and the surety stands in the
shoes of the creditor, entitled to the same rights as the creditor was entitled to.").
63
It is worth noting the general rule that claims for personal torts are not assignable. See City of Richmond v.
Hanes, 122 S.E.2d 895, 898 (Va. 1961) ("The general doctrine, both at law and in equity, is that rights of action for
torts causing injuries which are strictly personal and which do not survive are not capable of being assigned …. The
rule was based on principles of public policy to discourage champerty and maintenance.").
64
Cf. American Liberty Ins. Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 825 So.2d 786, 790 (It has been long recognized "that a surety
who pays the debt of his principal 'stands in the shoes' of the payee and may enforce the payee's rights in order to
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their right to sue must have been assigned to the government.65 But no rights transfer or statutory
subrogation occurred in the municipal cost recovery cases– nor were government plaintiffs
merely seeking reimbursement for transfers made to citizens.66
One author concedes that the "insurance collective" analogy is unsustainable.67 Lytton
states: “It would be a mistake to view efforts by government entities to recover public service
expenditures as subrogation actions,” because no assignment of the public’s rights has been
made to government, and because “government entities sue in their own right for their own
losses, which are distinguishable from the losses of their citizens.”68 Likewise, Galligan praises
the "tactical brilliance" behind firearms and tobacco recoupment suits, because they allegedly
"avoid the difficulties inherent in subrogation claims", including of course issues of contributory
and comparative negligence and assumption of risk by the defendant, which all are invokable
against a subrogated plaintiff.69 Unfortunately, without a subrogatory basis for their causes of
action, anti-FPSD supporters are left where they started: no duty is owed by a tortfeasor to the
fire department to minimize use of its service. In a somewhat astonishing aside, Lytton appears
to concede all this. He grants that “[d]uty analysis, if properly developed, might well provide
support for the free public services doctrine.70 But he concludes that “Courts have failed . . . to

seek reimbursement"); Sundheim v. Philadelphia School District, 166 A.2d 365 (Pa. 1933) (party seeking to enforce
subrogation "must point to some equitable right through the persons in whose shoes it stands").
65
Trevino v. HHL Financial Servs., Inc., 945 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Colo. 1997) ("Subrogation is a contractual or
statutory right pursuant to which a portion of an injured plaintiff's rights against the tortfeasor responsible for the
injuries are assigned to the subrogee.").
66
For a similar discussion of the legal flaws in municipal lawsuits against the gun industry, see Michael I. Krauss,
Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 MISS. L.J. 631, 640 (2001).
67
Lytton, supra note 10, at 751.
68
Id. (emphasis added). Lytton does not explain how this can be consistent with his comparison of government as a
corporation and citizens as shareholders. Shareholder losses are presumably equal to their proportionate ownership
share of the company’s loss.
69
Galligan, supra note 10 at 1023-24
70
Id. at 754.
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offer thoughtful duty analysis when it comes to the free public services doctrine.”71 But a
gratuitous charge of "thoughtlessness" does not a persuasive argument make.

B. Proximate Causation
In the typical municipal case against firearm manufacturers, a third factor, over and
above the government’s decision to rescue and the lack of a duty owed to government, precludes
government tort recovery. An intervening intentional tort by one or more criminals has typically
"broken the chain" of causation. Consistent with this doctrine, courts have found that an
intervening crime by a third party precludes proximate causation of plaintiff's harm as a matter of
law. 72 In most cases, for example, the criminal use of the firearm by a third party negates the
gun-maker's liability even if the latter was in some way negligent.

In common law tort, the

causal nexus between a plaintiff and a defendant, once created, does not extend across certain
intervening events, including deliberate human wrongdoing. These events interrupt the chain of
causation that began with the defendant’s wrongdoing.73 The traditional doctrine of causal
intervention is that “the free, deliberate, and informed act or omission of a human being,
intended to exploit the situation created by the defendant, negatives any causal connection.”74
Courts appear to be particularly willing to find a "break" in the "causal chain" if the
intentional tort committed by the third party is a violent crime. For example, in Stahlecker v.

71

Id. at 751. Emphasis added.
See, e.g., Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910), in which a tank car full of
gasoline derailed due to defendant’s negligence, resulting in a gas leak. Duerr, a third party, threw a match on the
leak, starting a fire that injured the plaintiff and his house. Defendants presented evidence that Duerr, who had been
discharged by the defendant that morning, intentionally started the fire. Duerr claimed, however, that he was
unaware of the leak and was merely lighting a cigar. The court found that the defendant was entitled to a directed
verdict on proximate cause grounds if the jury found that Duerr acted maliciously. Id. at 151.
73
Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827, 827 (2000).
74
HART AND HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 136 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis omitted).
72
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Ford Motor Co.,75 the court upheld a demurrer for a tire and a car manufacturer in a wrongful
death suit where a motorist was murdered after being stranded when one of her car's tires
failed.76 The court held that even if the tire was defective and unreasonably dangerous, it was
not the proximate cause of the motorist’s murder by a third party who encountered her alone in
an inoperable vehicle, because the criminal act by the murderer negated any causal relationship
between the motorist and the manufacturer.77

C.

Damages

FPSC opponents do not address damages as methodically as they do duty and causation,78

but they do consider municipalities to be directly damaged when they deploy emergency services
in response to negligent (corporate) tortfeasors. Indeed, the claim seems to be that government
damages are more intensely suffered than are private damages, because when government is a
tort victim, we are all victims:
Viewing the government as a tort victim undermines the idea that somehow
public services are free, as the doctrine suggests.

The costs of suppressing

negligently started fires or cleaning up oil spills or rescuing airline crash victims
are losses to society as a whole; they drain resources away from other private or
government activities. . . . Allowing government to sue for these losses in tort
shows them to be real costs that someone must bear, not merely free services. If
the tortfeasors whose conduct occasions these costs do not bear them, then all of
us will.79

75

667 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2003).
Id. at 258.
77
Id.
78
Lytton does note that economic damage arguments frequently do appear “alongside” FPSD dicta. See Lytton,
supra note 10, at 749. This curious inversion allows Lytton to mask the fact that the economic damages rule is "part
of" FPSD, not "alongside" it. Lytton commits the same mistake apropos proximate causation, opining that because
of the proximate causation requirement, “[e]ven in the absence of the free public services doctrine, most types of
law enforcement expenditures would remain unrecoverable.” Id. at 770. What this misses is that FPSD exists in part
because of proximate causation, not apart from it.
79
Id. at 779.
76
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Under this view, government damages are a straightforward proposition; one dollar spent
by a city fire department to save the property of a negligent defendant constitutes a dollar’s
worth of “damage” to the city. After all, that dollar was not “free”; it has been “drained away”
from other governmental activities.
There are two problems here. One is that negligently caused economic loss without
accompanying physical harm or damage to the plaintiff is generally not recoverable.69 Another
difficulty was suggested by an economic expert witness for the defendant oil company in the
mammoth Amoco Cadiz80 case. There, the Seventh Circuit had to consider whether FPSD could
protect Amoco from costs incurred by the French government to clean up an oil spill Amoco had
(allegedly negligently) caused off the coast of Brittany. The quesetion was whether some of the
claimed damages existed at all:
One could say . . . that there is a difference between proprietary and strictly
governmental operations because the proprietary arms of the government have
other things to do. If the workers of the Electricity Board were not repairing the
lines damaged by the plane, they could be constructing new lines; if the staff of
the phone company were not tracing a freeloader’s calls, they could be hooking
up new phones. But if the sailors of the French Navy were not skimming oil
[from the Cadiz spill], what would they be doing? Invading some neighbor? On
this view governmental operations are different because the opportunity costs of
their employees and equipment are zero. If they were not being used in the
cleanup, they would have no productive use at all.81
69

See Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111
(1998); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d
200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Byrd v. English. 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903).
80
See Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111
(1998); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d
200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Byrd v. English. 43 S.E. 419 (Ga. 1903).
81
Id. at 1313-14. In the end, the Seventh Circuit did not find this argument terribly persuasive, stating in dicta that
the French government most likely took the probability of such events into account when it decided how many ships
to build and how many sailors were required to staff them. Id. at 1314.
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Some commentators have countered that the opportunity cost of dousing a particular fire
is de minimis, and that governments are truly harmed only when they must supply emergency
services above and beyond a “normal” base level. McIntyre took this position, advocating
liability “only for extraordinary or excessive costs.

Common accidents would not trigger

liability because such accidents are within the zone of risk anticipated by response services.”82
Erich Rolf Luschei also defended this view in a 1986 article advocating user charges for
tortfeasors who negligently cause “excessive use of the government service.”83 Luschei
explained that limiting recoupment suits to excessive use “serves two purposes. First, it permits
‘subsidy,’ or cost spreading, for ’ordinary’ levels of public services. Second, it eliminates the
government’s costs of litigation by limiting the right of action.”84 We may feel entitled to some
use of public services through the payment of our taxes, but excessive use should incur tort
liability to the state.85
Under an “excessive expenditure” theory, “ordinary” government rescue costs such as
police and firefighter salaries, or the purchase and maintenance of "standard" equipment, would
be non-recoverable damages. Presumably, some standard level of service for each taxpayer -perhaps one call each to police and fire departments each year? -- would be permitted without the
government attempting to recoup expenses. Above the standard level of service, however, if
wrongdoing underlay the expenditure, costs could be recouped by the government agency,
through either a flat-rate "user fee," an individualized tax bill based on the actual cost of the

82

McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1017. Because “disasters” conceivably could be caused by individuals as well as
corporations, McIntyre did not advocate limiting disaster response recovery lawsuits to corporate tortfeasors. For
his definition of “disasters,” see McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1001, n.10.
83
Erich Rolf Luschei, Government Recovery of Emergency Service Expenditures: An Analysis of User Charges, 19
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 993 (1986).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 974, n.15.
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service, or a common law tort suit to recoup "excess" expenditures.86 Alternatively, government
rescue services might be financed much as water service is billed, by individually calculating
fees based on the level of protection required (pumper? tanker? long hose?) ex ante for a
particular property rather than through indirect financing methods such as property tax.87 One
proposal for funding fire protection makes fees a function of a formula that includes the property
value, size of the property, number of occupants, and the ex ante probability of fire.88 In such a
system, collective loss-spreading is reduced but deterrence (see below) enhanced through the
granting of discounts off the "tax" bill for the installation of protective systems like smoke
detectors and sprinklers.89
This of course has everything to do with insurance and nothing to do with tort– for under
this plan, actuarially correct ex ante risk, not ex post corrective justice, determines the "premium"
(not the "award")

to be paid by each “insured” (not each "defendant") to the municipal

government.90 Such proposals do bear a resemblance to some anarcho-capitalistic visions for
abolishing government; private fire insurance carriers originally fought fires and contractually

86

Such legal action need not be tort-based. Liability might result from abnormal use of a government service, under
public ordering, i.e., whether fault-based or not. Thus, a system of fees could be instituted, such as that used in the
mid-1990s at Yosemite National Park to recover the cost of search-and-rescue missions for hikers and climbers. In
1996 the Park billed two rock climbers found guilty by a U.S. magistrate of “creating a hazardous condition” for the
cost of their rescue: $13,325. Christopher Reynolds, Much Talk, Little Action on Charging for Rescues, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1998, at L2.
87
Such proposals are popular with anarcho-capitalists who believe that services such as fire protection are private
rather than public goods. See, e.g., ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., CUTTING BACK CITY HALL 62 (Universe Books 1980).
88
This proposal was suggested by William Pollack to encourage spending to shift from fire suppression to fire
prevention, and a form of it was adopted by Inglewood, California in 1978. Id. at 62-63. As mentioned in POOLE,
supra note 87, , private fire insurers originally both fought fires and paid for damages.
89
Id.
90
Corrective justice posits that resources are transferred from one party to another in the tort system in order to
compensate for damage wrongly inflicted by the first party on the second party. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE
IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 56-83 (1995). See also Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory
of Tort Compensation, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1567 (1997).
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compensated their clients (with subrogation rights against fire-setters) for fire damages they did
not succeed in preventing.91 But none of this involves wrongdoing –none of this sounds in tort.

In fact, municipal tort recoupment suits are seen as means to replenish government
treasuries. Overtime costs,92 outlays for the acquisition of specialized equipment93 or supplies
purchased for a specific rescue94 have been claimed. In City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc.,
discussed below, the court noted that the city was claiming a common law right to sue for
“excessive use of its fire department.”95 D.C., in Air Florida, asked for “extraordinary expenses”
borne by the District and occasioned by the airline crash.96 In the litigation following the
accident at Three Mile Island, the Third Circuit provisionally declined to ratify the District
court’s ruling that deployment of emergency personnel by local communities was unrecoverable
under FPSD.97 The District court had granted summary judgment because “[t]he type of damages
claimed is similar to that produced by other man-made catastrophes such as fires, explosions,
collapsing structures and the like,”98 but the Third
Circuit held that the issue of whether a “nuclear incident” is an exceptional hazard not
subject to ordinary government services was a new question to be resolved at trial.99

91

POOLE, supra note 87. Ironically, proposals like Pollack’s would transform firefighters into monopoly insurers,
turning on its head the anarcho-capitalist dream.
92
See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 719 F.2d 322,at 323 (9th Cir. 1983); Morgan
City v.; Fontenot, 460 So. 2d 685,at 687 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Koch v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 62, 468 N.E.2d
1,at 8 (N.Y. 1984); and City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 50 (N.J. Super. 1976).
93
See, e.g., City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 50; and Fontenot, 460 So. 2d at 686. According to McIntyre, Air Florida
involved rental by the District of Columbia of cranes to lift plane wreckage from the Potomac River. McIntyre,
supra note 10, at 1005 n.27.
94
Part of the costs Pennsylvania sued to recover in Three Mile Island related litigation was for emergency supplies.
In Re TMI, 710 F.2d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 1983).
95
369 A.2d at 54 (emphasis added).
96
750 F.2d 1077,at 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984)..
97
Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utilities Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983).
98
Id. at 121.
99
Id. The issue was never resolved. The parties settled the case without another trial. McIntyre, supra note 10 at
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On the other hand, many have noted the anomaly of governments seeking common law
reimbursement from some for services long provided without charge to others. In the gun lawsuit
filed by Boston,100 the court summarized cases applying FPSD in these words:
Fires, fuel spills and ruptured gas mains are all frequent happenings which, while
every effort is made to prevent them, can be expected to occur. Train derailments
and airplane crashes are more unusual, but not so rare that a municipality can
never expect to have to respond to such an emergency. . . . [S]uch contingencies
are part of the normal and expected costs of municipal existence, and absent
legislation providing otherwise are costs to be allocated to the municipality’s
residents through taxes. In addition, in those cases there is no evidence that the
specific defendants had engaged in a repeated course of conduct causing recurring
costs to the municipality.101
In recent years, cash-strapped, high-end communities have struggled to discourage
excessive use of public services. These efforts have not usually taken the form of recoupment
suits. In 1986 the Ventura County, California fire department weighed whether to fine parents
up to $10,000 for wildfires caused by their children.102 A former chief of the Ventura fire
department explained the rationale: “It was felt that it was not fair to the average taxpayer to bear
the brunt of suppression costs of fires that were set either deliberately or by gross negligence.103
Apparently extinguishing such fires, for the fire department, was “over and above our normal
service.104 Ojecting with what reads as a classic defense of FPSD, the father of a suspected child
arsonist told a reporter: “I feel it’s the [fire] department’s civic duty [and not mine] to take care

1032 n.175.
100
City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352 at *33-34.
101
Id.
102
Mack Reed, Parents of Fire Starters Smoldering Over the Bill, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1996, at B1.
103
Id. at B1.
104
Id.
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of [fires].”105 Of course, on basic tort principles a (negligent or intentional) fire-setter is liable for
property she destroys – the issue in Ventura was whether a parent who was not liable for his
child under California common law should nonetheless be liable for cleanup costs, as opposed to
the property actually burned. Crucial to the case, however, was the fact that the county's suit was
authorized by state legislation that superseded common law.106
Many communities impose regulatory fees for those who “overuse” rescue services.
Debates over such fees probe the nature of government service and of community self-help. For
example, to cut down on abuse of the “911” emergency telephone system, the Los Angeles City
Council imposed fees on anyone who called the city fire department for routine medical
treatment in 1991.107 A newspaper report noted that “paramedics say some of the most
demanding [911] callers are wage-earning citizens who complain that they are taxpayers who
have a right to city ambulance service.”108 Fairfax County, Virginia in 2004 enacted fees of $300
to $550 for residents requiring the use of emergency ambulance service.109 Not all citizens
thought the new fees were fair; one complained, “[w]e pay the highest taxes in the [Washington,
D.C.] area; we shouldn’t have to pay for emergency ambulance service.”110
Often quasi-criminal legislation recoups costs associated with antisocial behavior. Faced
with thousands of calls for police to check out burglar alarms, in recent years numerous
municipalities have issued citations to citizens whose security systems repeatedly sound false
105

Id.
Id. California’s Health & Safety Code § 13009 authorizes actions by government agencies to recover the costs of
fire suppression and emergency services connected to fighting negligently or illegally set fires.
107
Laurie Becklund, Fire Dept. Plays it Safe by Responding to All 911 Calls, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at A1.
108
Id.
109
Jim McElhatton, Fairfax to Levy Ambulance Fee, WASH. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at B2. The fees would vary
based on the level of emergency services required. Additionally, citizens would be charged $7.50 per mile. Lisa
Rein, Fairfax Jobs for Retarded Renewed, WASH. POST, May 25, 2004, at B1. Clearly this was an effort to fund
municipal services through employees' health insurance plans – it is highly doubtful that the county would pursue an
uninsured taxpayer personally for ambulance services. Medical insurance is "invisible" (paid for nominally by
employers in whole or in part), while taxes are often all-too "visible" come election time.
110
Letters to the Editor, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at T4 (Fairfax Extra section).
106
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alarms.111 Virginia law allows localities to charge for expenses associated with emergency
responses to DUI violations and similar traffic offenses.112 A companion statute allows Virginia
localities to recover expenses incurred in an emergency response to a terrorism hoax.113 Of
course, fines are also user fees in some cases: traffic tickets may be seen as a charge for the
approximate cost of rescuing those involved in private misuse of the public highways. The key
characteristic of all these measures is that they are enacted legislatively. They are state
regulations of its relationships with citizens, i.e., manifestations of public ordering.114 None of
these fines or fees is seen as a common law tort liability.115 Public debate over user fees shows
that these questions are, at their core, concerned with the fundamental nature of the polity. Many
taxpayers do not view city rescue expenditures as “damage” to a “victim,” but rather as outlays
incurred as a matter of public policy, to be "funded" in a fair manner, to be determined after
public debate. Of such public affairs the common law is not made.

III.

FPSD and Policy
Despite this article's efforts to portray tort as "non-instrumental", i.e., as a mechanism of

corrective justice without any overarching social goal, the reader may not be persuaded. Such is
the pull of "policy studies" today that many are sure that every legal rule must conceal a hidden
or explicit policy judgment, i.e., that public and private law compartments are far from
111

See, e.g., Lewis Kamb, Burglar Alarms Cry Wolf – Police Cry Foul, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 11,
2001, at A1.
112
Va. Code Ann. § 15-1716 (West 2005) (originally enacted in 1997). The statute allows localities to charge a
$250 flat fee, or a per-minute fee not to exceed $1,000. Note, however, that routine non-emergency services
resulting in a DUI conviction are not recoverable under the statute, consistent with the statute having carved out a
narrow exception to the common law FPSD. See Va. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 04-054, 2004 WL 2361387 (Va. Att’y
Gen. 2004).
113
Va. Code Ann. § 15-1716.1 (West 2005) (originally enacted in 2002).
114
See, e.g., Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, supra note 26; Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as
Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort, supra note 66 (comparing private ordering and public ordering).
115
The malicious terrorist phone call comes closest to being a tort – but the plaintiff would have to be the intended
victim, who could sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
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watertight. This essay's view, controversial but widely held,116 is that tort's sole purpose is "to be
tort," to establish liability when and only when duty, breach, causation and cognizable damages
are present. As we have seen, this vision of tort buttresses FPSD. But the defense of FPSD need
not rely on this foundational argument. Even assuming their relevance, we can dismiss the
"policy arguments" that allegedly undergird the criticism of the Free Public Services Doctrine, at
least as it pertains to corporate defendants.

A.

The Red Herring Called Deterrence

The case against FPSD typically holds that free public services generate an "externality:"
"too much" of the behavior the public service serves to remedy. "Internalizing" this "externality"
will result in optimal deterrence. Taxes, fees and fines won't accomplish this adequately, it is
said, so tort law must take up the slack. In particular, critics claim that corporations create a need
for substantial public services, but won't "pay their way" unless we abrogate FPSD. Luschei
maintains that "[c]harging tortfeasors for the cost of emergency services may reduce the
frequency and severity of tortious behavior."117 Galligan writes that suits by governments
against tortfeasors play a "key role" in providing "efficient deterrence, as legal economists use
that term."118 McIntyre argues that "tortfeasor liability for the cost of disaster response services
wold more accurately reflect the true cost of accidents than does he present system of localized
taxpayer subsidies."119
As regards the corporations that (we will see) critics particularly target, note that
corporate tortfeasors cannot typically direct damage onto municipal services. Corporations bear
full liability as tortfeasors for harm they negligently or intentionally cause to persons and

116

. See, e.g., WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, PASSIM.
Luschei, supra note 83, at 972.
118
Galligan, supra note 10, at 1020.
119
McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1015.
117
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property, including of course government property. In addition, a corporation internalizes harm
inflicted on its own property and business model. Corporate tortfeasors can rarely be confident
that their negligence will require the deployment of, say, the municipal fire department, without
damaging nearby businesses or the company’s own storage facility, for both of which the
corporation is presumably already adequately deterred.120
The deterrence argument must be that tort law underdeters corporate tortfeasors because
a fraction of the social cost of their (wrongful) behavior is borne by the public weal. Note
however that this claim applies to every negligent action, by a corporation or an individual, that
has been perpetrated since the common law of tort evolved. For example, negligent behavior
results in liability only for proximately caused harm, thereby “externalizing” remote "but-for"
costs.

The deterrence argument might therefore entail the disappearance of the notion of

proximate causation, as economic analysts like Guido Calabresi have in fact advocated.121 Tort
law’s "economic loss" doctrine may also be a culprit from this perspective. The driver who
negligently causes an accident on the George Washington Bridge during New York's rush hour
does not owe compensation to the thousands of commuters who lose pay because their arrival at
work is delayed, or to the employers who lose profit because their workers are delayed, or to the
police departments that incur overtime expenditures redirecting traffic. Without this revolution
in Tort, there might be “too many” breakdowns on the George Washington Bridge during rush
hour.
As noted, deterrence-based arguments like these are simply not persuasive to those who
ground tort law on notions of corrective justice, and for whom proximate causation properly
120

And of course corporate reputation would invariably be affected by wrongdoing, to the direct detriment of the
corporate tortfeasor, absent any tort award.
121
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69
(1975).
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encapsulates the corrective demand.122 Even for economic theories of tort based on "KaldorHicks" wealth maximization123 and deterrence, the argument against FPSD is vulnerable.124 But
in any case, FPSD critics do not advance this argument – for they do not advocate the general
abolition of proximate causation, the economic loss doctrine, and duty analysis. They appear to
care only, and peculiarly, about corporate negligence provoking one kind of remote economic
harm, rescue services. For that narrow subset of remote results of wrongdoing the deterrence
argument is quite simply unavailable to them, if they wish to be coherent.
Negligent defendants typically don't dispute that they are liable for physical damage to
governmental property, and for costs incurred to protect property (public and private) from
physical damage. Such was the situation in Amoco Cadiz.125 The Seventh Circuit noted: “The
bulk of the expenses were incurred [by France] in protecting and restoring public property.
Amoco concedes that France is entitled to compensation for such costs. . . .”126 The primary
dispute in Amoco Cadiz was whether France padded its bill by failing to adequately “separate the
costs of protecting proprietary interests from other expenses. . . .”127 Similarly, in Air Florida128
the D.C. government’s suit to recover public service expenditures was ultimately unsuccessful,
but the airline quickly conceded liability for $70,000 in damage done to DC's 14th Street
Bridge.129 In the seminal FPSD case City of Briegeton v B.P. Oil, Inc., the New Jersey Superior

122

See Weinrib , THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90; (1995); Michael I. Krauss, Tort Law and Private
Ordering,supra note 26, at 625-27. Galligan replies, with candor for his revolutionary goals, that "corrective
justice…is not reflective of our post-millennium reality." Galligan, supra note 10, at 1030.
123
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); contra Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
191 (1980).
124
See, e.g., W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1982) (defending tort law’s refusal to
grant damages for “economic loss” on deterrence grounds).
125
In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992).
126
Id. at 1310-11.
127
Id. at 1310.
128
District of Columbia v. Air Florida, 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
129
Al Kamen, District Agrees to Settlement by Air Florida, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1983, at B8. The airline and the
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Court denied recovery for fire department costs to contain a spill on defendants' land, bt noted
that "if the city were the owner of adjacent land damaged by escaping oil, it, like all landowners,
may recover damages caused by the escape."130
Looming in the background of this very partial deterrence argument is a seeming bias
against corporations. For example, Lytton argues that “there is no relation between the tax rates
of … corporations and the costs of the public services that their activities occasion,” resulting in
underinvestment in safety.131 That corporate tax rates have no intrinsic relation to public service
consumption is incontrovertible.

But there is an equally weak link between tax rates of

individuals and the cost of the public services these individuals’ activities occasion. Do we know
whether individuals "subsidize" corporations on this account or vice versa, or whether, as seems
to me more likely, some individuals and corporations "subsidize" other individuals and
corporations? One wonders why, for example, those opposed to FPSD do not channel their
concern with deterrence by addressing the possibility that large numbers of individuals (for
instance, those who decline to evacuate their homes in the face of an approaching hurricane)
systematically underinvest in safety because they expect government to bail them out.

If

deterrence is a primary rationale for abolishing FPSD, should individuals also be required to pay
for emergency services they use?
As compared with individuals, corporations arguably have a greater desire to take extra
care to guard against public service expenditures due to their negligence, because corporations
are more solvent than individuals, because they (unlike most individuals) have goodwill that

plane’s manufacturer also settled out of court with nearly all of the survivors and victims’ relatives for around $50
million less than two years after the crash occurred, in one of the quickest air crash settlements ever. Kenneth
Bredermeier, $50 Million Paid in Air Florida Crash Claims, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1983, at A1.
130
City of Bridgeton v B.P.Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49. at 55.
131
Lytton, supra note 10, at 766.
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cannot be adequately protected by insurance,132 and because they are more likely to self-insure
even for physical damages proximately caused by their negligence.133 Insurance surely dulls
incentives,134 but even insured-against harms damage corporate goodwill. Corporations feel
pressure to avoid the negative publicity that no doubt results from disasters such as the Air
Florida crash, the Cadiz oil spill, or the Three Mile Island incident.135 Individuals’ incentives to
behave non-negligently are arguably much more dulled by insurance (or by "free" rescue
services) than are corporations’. Even if damage from a corporate disaster has been somehow
largely confined to expenditures made by government for rescue, containment, and cleanup,
citizens will harbor negative feelings toward the corporation for using up these communities'
scarce resources.136 These feelings often get translated into hefty punitive damages awards for
physical damages caused, which surely deter and quite possibly over-deter, and to which
corporations are almost uniquely vulnerable.137 Indeed, protection of goodwill is one reason why
corporations (though rarely individuals) frequently reimburse victims for damages they are not

132

See Joseph R. Dancy, Electronic Media, Due Diligence, and the New Industrial Revolution, 53 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. 72, 80 (1999) (stating that in if a company has “a traditional insurance program like [most] companies, chances
are the company has little or no coverage for . . . serious damage caused to its goodwill . . . .”).
133
Sidney G. Saltz, Allocation of Insurable Risks in Commercial Leases, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 490
(2002) (“[M]any large companies self-insure risks of loss to others caused by their negligence . . . .”); see also
Douglas R. Richmond, Self-Insurance and the Decision to Settle, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 987, 996 (1995) (“Selfinsurance has become increasingly popular among commercial entities . . . .”).
134
See, e.g., KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1971). Health insurance in particular
creates numerous moral hazard problems. Mark V. Pauly, Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, AM. ECON. REV.
Vol. 58 (No. 3), 531 (1968).
135
For example, after the Exxon Valdez disaster off the cost of Alaska in 1989, consumer advocate Ralph Nader and
several environmental groups called for a boycott of the company. Philip Shabecoff, Six Groups Urge Boycott of
Exxon, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1989, at A17.
136
In an era of global communication, anger about large industrial accidents need not only be confined to
communities located near the site of the disaster. For example, after a pesticide plant leaked deadly chemicals in
Bhopal, India in 1994 killing more than 2,000, name recognition among Americans of Union Carbide, the majority
shareholder of the plant, increased greatly, as did negative feelings toward the company. Stuart Jackson, Union
Carbide’s Good Name Takes a Beating, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec.31, 1984-Jan. 7, 1985, at 40.
137
For example, Exxon was ordered to pay $4.5 billion in punitive damages for the 1989 spill resulting from the
grounding of the Valdez off the coast of Alaska. Susan Beck, $1.3 Bil. in Fees Awarded in Exxon Valdez Litigation,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, March 9, 2004, at 5. Over-deterrence in such a case might be declining to ship oil in the
first place.
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obliged to pay in tort, as well as for damages suffered by third parties through no fault of the
corporation at all.138
It is reckless to assume, sans data, that corporations (alone among tortfeasors) have
insufficient incentive to prevent or limit the scope of disasters. Unless a corporation is fly-bynight or insolvent -- in which case the abolition of FPSD would not affect anything -- it will be
sensitive to reputational loss as well as to court-ordered payments. Complex empirical studies
could determine whether the current net incentive is in some sense “optimal” and, if it is
somehow “suboptimal,” whether this “suboptimality” is the result of bankruptcy law, damages
rules, insurance rules, agency problems resulting from limited liability, or from some other
feature of American law. The selective use of deterrence rationale to justify abrogating FPSD,
and for corporations only, is unpersuasive.

B.

Policy Reasons Why Public Services Are Supplied by Governments
There is one policy question sometimes hinted at by critics of FPSD, but which they fail

to substantially address: should governments supply public services at zero marginal cost to
users, whether the user be an individual or a corporation?

138

Although the law was unclear as to whether manufacturers were liable for injuries caused by criminal producttampering, in 1991 Johnson & Johnson settled with the families of the seven Chicago-area residents who died nine
years earlier after taking Tylenol that had been laced with cyanide. Although few of the terms of settlement were
made public, they included college education funds for the eight children whose parents had died in the tragedy. P.
Davis Szymczak, Settlement Reached in Tylenol Suit, CHI. TRIBUNE, May 14, 1991, at 1.
In the well-known case of Bolton v. Stone, a woman sued a neighboring cricket club after being hit and injured while
standing outside her home by a ball that had strayed from the playing field. 1951 App. Cas. 850. One of the judges
appeared surprised that, although legal liability did not lie in tort because the accident was held to be unforeseeable,
the defendant club “offer[ed] no more consolation to his victim than the reflection that a social being is not immune
from social risks. . . .” Id.
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The answer to this question is a function of one's view of the proper role of government.
For an extreme communitarian, all losses are “our losses,” so they should perhaps all be borne by
“us.” The New Zealand plan, abolishing much of tort law to pay for accidents from the public
fisc, reflects such a view.139 Alternatively perhaps government should be a subrogated insurer, a
clearinghouse for corrective justice transfers but an ultimate bearer of no losses itself whenever
tortfeasors are solvent. But should government be doing something that, say, State Farm
Insurance Co. can do? These are important questions for political philosophy, and tangentially
for tort theory. Surely such questions should be the fulcrum of a critique of FPSD. Alas, critics
of FPSD have not felt the need to address them.
Protection provided by government in times of adversity surely spreads costs.
Corporations are not the only beneficiaries of this protection. Corporations are, after all, in
essence nexi of contracts among individuals.140 Corporate employees, officers and shareholders
may all be comforted knowing that government will be there to provide public services when
needed by a corporation, which will not be billed for them afterward.141 If "free" public
protection was extended only to individuals, this modification of tort law would be equivalent to
a tax on the corporate form. FPSD critics142 fail to show why such a tax is needed, i.e., why

139

In the mid-1960s, the government of New Zealand commissioned a study of the country's workers' compensation
system. The Royal Commission was simply to make suggestions with respect to workers'compensation but instead
ended up recommending abolition of the tort system across the board. Following the Royal Commission study, in
1974, New Zealand enacted a no-fault accident compensation system to replace tort remedies for accidents resulting
in personal injuries. See Miller, The Future of New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme, 11 U. HAW. L. REV.
1, 4 (1989) (describing the compensation scheme in New Zealand).
140
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12, 15-17
(1991).
141
Lytton seems to want to make a public example of corporations experiencing disasters. He admits that
“[e]liminating the doctrine would encourage litigation -- well publicized in the case of industrial accidents -- that
portrays these losses as costs for which someone must take responsibility.” Lytton, supra note 10 at 780.
142
In addition to those already mentioned, note that Galligan's "public torts" are directed at manufacturers.
Galligan, supra note 10, at 1023. McIntyre focuses on large-scale disasters not typically caused by individuals.
McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1003.

32

Public Services Meet Private Law ©Michael I. Krauss 2006

Page 33 of 53

current corporate taxes are "too low." Why are they not "just right", or even, perhaps, "too
high"?
Emergency services, often originally provided by private enterprise,143 have evolved to
become proprietary government functions for reasons that can be understood economically and
philosophically. Economically, government services sometimes have characteristics of public
goods that cannot be provided privately.144 The production of emergency services arguably
generates pervasive benefits for which private providers may be unable to charge. Like national
security, the availability of emergency services may benefit everyone in the community, whether
each individual pays for them or not.

Providing such goods for some necessarily means

providing them for all.145 Economists refer to this kind of benefit as a "neighborhood effect."
Unless producers of public goods can extract payments from every user of a service, each
member of the community has an incentive to "free-ride" on the willingness of others to pay for
them. No private producer will step in to satisfy a general demand for such services because no
producer can extract profits from free-riding consumers. Spread across a community, the twin
problems of neighborhood effects and free-riding can result in market failure – an unsatisfied
demand for a beneficial good.146
Philosophically, through the political process, we have generally resolved that public
funding of some services is just. Modern notions of individual autonomy suggest that it is
143

DAVID BEITO, FROM MUTUAL AID TO THE WELFARE STATE: FRATERNAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 18901967 (2000). In the seventeenth century, firefighting was connected to fire insurance and was therefore privately
provided. See Harry M. Johnson, The History of British and American Fire Marks, J. OF RISK & INSURANCE, Vol.
39 (No. 3) 405, 406 (1972). The earliest public firefighting company in England was not formed until 1866. Id. at
407. In colonial America, collective, mutual-assistance firefighting companies predated private insurance. Private
companies insuring against, as well as fighting and reimbursing volunteer companies who fought fires on the
property of their insurance customers, arose in the mid-1700s. Id. at 414-17.
144
See generally R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
145
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, 3 LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 43-44
(1979).
146
See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 46-50 (Liberty Fund
2000) [1975]; and BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW 271-77 (1990).
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inappropriate to allow the market to determine who receives vital services like police and fire
protection. Market distribution of such services would arguably favor the wealthy and wellorganized at the expense of the poor and helpless. The moral sensibilities of most recoil at the
suggestion that the poor should only receive sub-standard or unresponsive police or fire
protection because they are "not willing" to pay for more.
This understanding appears to underlay the New Jersey Superior Court’s eloquent
opinion in City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil.147 Granting defendants’ motion to dismiss a lawsuit by
which a city sought reimbursement for salaries it paid to contain an oil spill, the court declared:
“It has been stated that ‘It cannot be a tort for government to govern.’ Neither is government a
saleable commodity.”148 Calling attention to the fact that fire protection had once been a private
function, the court affirmed that it was assuredly a government duty now.149 The reason behind
the transformation was explained the following way:
Governments, to paraphrase the Declaration of Independence, have been
instituted among men to do for the public good those things which the people
agree are best left to the public sector. Since our country was founded there has
developed a widening horizon of public activity. True, certain activities have
developed in areas from which revenue has been derived, such as turnpikes, water
or power supply, or postal services. Nevertheless, there remains an area where
the people as a whole absorb the cost of such services -- for example the
prevention and detection of crime. No one expects the rendering of a bill (other
than a tax bill) if a policeman apprehends a thief. The services of fire fighters are
within this ambit and may not be billed as a public utility. . . .
[A] municipal corporation may not recover as damages the costs of its
governmental operations which [sic] it was created to perform. . . . Thus, if the
147

City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
Id.City of Bridgeton, 369 A.2d at 54 (quoting Amelchenko v. Freehold, 42 N.J. 542, 550 (1964)).
149
Id.
148
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city were the owner of adjacent land damaged by escaping oil, it, like all
landowners, may recover damages caused by this escape. It cannot, however,
recover costs incurred in fire protection or extinguishment. That is the very
purpose of government for which it was created.150
Bridgeton has proven influential – and for good cause.151 The idea that the nature and
functions of government are to be decided in the public political arena, not through private law
adjudication, is foundational to FPSD. The Ninth Circuit conceded as much in City of Flagstaff
v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway152 when it held that “the cost of public services for
protection from a fire or safety hazards is to be borne by the public as a whole. . . .153 The court
concluded:
Even if we were satisfied [which we are not] that we had the information to
choose the more "efficient cost avoider" in this case . . . an added factor counsels
deference to the legislature. Here governmental entities themselves currently bear
the cost in question, and they have taken no action to shift it elsewhere. If the
government has chosen to bear the cost for reasons of economic efficiency, or
even as a subsidy to the citizens and their business, the decision implicates fiscal
policy; the legislature and its public deliberative processes, rather than the court,
is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns.154
Cases like Bridgeton and Flagstaff reflect courts' crucial insight into the differences
between private and public law. Services the collectivity has chosen to provide are publicly

150

Id. at 54-55.
For example, the “Declaration of Independence” rationale in Bridgeton was quoted in Fontenot, 460 So.2d 685,
at 688 (La. Ct. App. 1984), and City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
A few of the cases citing Bridgeton as a basis for their decisions include Koch v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 62 468
N.E.2d 1, 8 (N.Y. 1984); Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Construction Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1987); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3601 at *39 (Oh. Ct. App. 2000),
rev’d, 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
152
City of Flagstaff v. Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
153
Id. at 323.
154
Id. at 323-24.
151
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funded goods until this is otherwise decided in the political arena. Government can fund
activities in various ways: by instituting user fees, by establishing funding lotteries, or by
imposing taxes, including taxes on corporations if it is thought that they are not paying their "fair
share." Criminals can be charged for the police work leading to their arrest;155 convicts can be
charged a "hotel bill."156 Public ordering aside, courts must not shift public costs as a common
law function. To follow FPSD opponents' prescription would be to make an end-run around the
political process and to engage in exactly the judicial regulation, and the usurpation of tort law,
that Lytton, for one, purports to condemn.157

C.

Judicial Policy Making

It is in labeling the free public services doctrine "judicial policy making" that FPSD
opponents make their ultimate egregious error. Lytton calls FPSD a “judicial invention,”158 but
in fact courts that invoke the doctrine see it as emblematic of judicial restraint.159 To cure the
defects he sees in FPSD, Lytton concludes that “[s]imply overturning [FPSD] . . . would be
justified, easy, and well within the legitimate powers of the courts.”160 Lytton thus promotes
abandoning a common law rule intimately linked to the distinction between private and public

155

See, e.g., Local Government Assistance, State Court and Fees for Justice Courts for Offenses Committed After
December 31, 2005, http://www.window.state.tx.us/lga/courtcosts06/3.html (last visited Jun. 25, 2006) (describing
fees for services of peace officers, including arrest fees and warrant fees).
156
See, e.g., Marla A. Goldberg, Suspect Denies Slaying Bruno, THE REPUBLICAN (Springfield, MA), Dec. 28, 2005,
at A1 (stating that two men convicted in federal court of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering venture were
ordered to pay about $31,000 to cover prison costs); Mafia Boss Ordered to Pay Prison Costs, MIAMI HERALD, Sep.
11, 2005, at A3 (“A federal judge Friday ordered the former head of the New England Mafia to reimburse the
government almost $120,000 for the cost of his eight years in prison.”).
157
The goal of the common law is corrective justice, or righting wrongs between the parties at bar, not distributive
justice, or ensuring that the community’s resources are distributed in a just manner given political considerations.
See Ernest J. Weinrib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 90, at 204-231.
158
Lytton, supra note 10, at 780.
159
See, e.g., City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49, 54 (N.J. Super. 1976) (“It has been stated that ‘It
cannot be a tort for government to govern.’”).
160
Lytton, supra note 10, at 780.
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law.161 How can this be done by a “restrained” court?162 Similarly, Wendy Wagner has argued
that gun litigation is a way of overcoming "stubborn information problems" and reaping
"regulatory benefits" not obtainable through the legislative process.163 It is difficult to see what
this has to do with judicial restraint, the Rule of Law, or tort.
This wolf-in-sheep's clothing approach (judicial activism under the guise of judicial
restraint) may in fact characterize much of Professor Lytton's scholarship. Lytton has made
radical, tort-transforming arguments in support of suits against the firearms industry:
"The military strategist Karl von Clausewitz asserted that war is a continuation of
politics by other means. The same might be said of gun litigation . . . 164
"[C]ourts

should play a secondary role in policy-making that complements the

regulatory efforts of legislatures and administrative agencies . . . [subject to] more
focused legislative responses to litigation, where legislatures disagree with the
policy implications of particular judicial decisions165
"[but the] legislature should do so in a restrained way, one that respects the
preeminence of courts in shaping tort doctrine and preserves the regulatory
benefits of tort litigation166
"[M]ore focused responses promote the integrity of tort doctrine, respect the
separation of powers, and preserve a regulatory role for the courts.167

161

See Krauss, Tort Law and Private Ordering, supra note 26, at 653-54.
In fact, Lytton dislikes the free public services doctrine so much that he is apparently indifferent as to just which
party -- the courts or the legislature -- should take the lead in ending it. He argues at one point that judges should
abolish the doctrine (leaving the legislature free to reestablish it by statute if desired) and at another that the doctrine
“should be replaced with a statutory scheme that generally allows government to sue in tort for public service
expenditures subject to specific exceptions.” Lytton, supra note 10, at 780.
163
Wendy Wagner, Stubborn Information Problems & the Regulatory Benefits of Gun Litigation, in LYTTON, SUING
THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 271.
164
LYTTON, SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY, supra note 14, at 152.
165
Id. at 153.
166
Id. at 170.
167
Id. at 170.
162
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IV.
GENERAL CRITICISMS OF THE FREE PUBLIC SERVICES DOCTRINE: FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS
AND COMPARISONS
This article has heretofore chipped away at the arguments employed by the critics of
FPSD. It is now time to pass from the defense to the offense. FPSD criticism, it turns out, is
biased, inefficient, and unprincipled.
A.

What's Incorporation Got To Do With It?

Dean Prosser described FPSD thus: “The state can never sue in tort in its political or
governmental capacity, although as the owner of property it may resort to the same tort actions
as any individual proprietor to recover for injuries to the property or to recover the property
itself.”168 So FPSD is not, on its face, confined to damages caused by corporate tortfeasors.
Yet in the introduction to his argument against FPSD Lytton affirms that “[t]he [free
public services] doctrine shields industrial tortfeasors from liability for cleanup costs, passing
these costs on to the public. It constitutes a tort subsidy to industry and functions as an insurance
scheme for industrial accidents.”169 He elsewhere pronounces that, “[i]n many instances, the
doctrine lets industrial tortfeasors off the hook for forest fires, oil spills, and airline crashes and
makes taxpayers pay the cleanup costs,”170 and that FPSD is an “undesirable tort subsidy to
careless industries.”171 He flatly charges courts that have applied the doctrine with “pro-industry

168

PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS § 2, p.7 (5th ed. 1984). Prosser is describing an underlying rule of tort, although he
does not explicitly label it as “the free public services doctrine.” Prosser notes that the rule governs municipal
corporations as well as states. Id. at n.7. Lytton’s refusal to recognize this underlying rule is what leads him to
conclude that only ten states recognize the doctrine – other states simply decline to use the label. See, e.g., County
of Champaign v. Anthony, 337 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (quoting Prosser in affirming dismissal of
county’s lawsuit against criminal defendant for cost of protecting witness who testified against him at trial).
169
Lytton, supra note 10, at 730 (emphasis added).
170
Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
171
Id. at 781 (emphasis added).
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bias.”172 Relying on these arguments, a recent New Jersey decision refused to apply FPSD to
reject a city's suit against a gun manufacturer because of the "unfairness" of allowing corporate
tortfeasors to use public services the same way that private citizens do.173
Anti-FPSD citations refer overwhelmingly to corporate defendants, be they chemical
companies,174 railroads175 or firearm manufacturers176 Yet one might ask, what's incorporation
got to do with this problem? Much government assistance targets individual victims who have
either negligently caused their own peril, or who have been injured by other culpable individuals.
From Coast Guard rescue of careless boaters to welfare benefits for single mothers to helicopter

172

Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27, 48-49 (N.J. Super. 2003).
174
E.g., in note 2 Lytton cites to: Kodiak Island Borough v. Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1999) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant oil company in suit by cities to recover costs for cleanup of Exxon Valdez oil
spill); Mayor & Council of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding
judgment for city for property damage resulting from chemical fire, but denying recovery for costs to city of fighting
the fire); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J. Super. 1976) (affirming denial of recovery for costs
incurred by municipal fire department in containing oil spill); and City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d
83 (Pa. Commonw. Ct. 1986) (affirming dismissal of city suit to recover costs of deploying police to the scene of
gas pipeline explosion). In note 3 Lytton cites to In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1992)
(upholding liability of oil and shipbuilding companies for oil spill at sea).
175
In note 2, Lytton cites Town of Howard v. Soo Line R.R., 217 N.W.2d 329 (Wis. 1974) (reversing summary
judgment to plaintiff town for recovery of fire-fighting costs resulting from railroad negligence). In note 3 he cites:
City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming summary
judgment for railroad in suit by city for recovery of emergency costs expended following derailment); Allenton
Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. Soo Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (dismissing fire department’s suit to
recover costs of fighting fires caused by defendant railroad); United States v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 547
F.2d 1101 (10th Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery for firefighting costs and damage to federal land negligently caused
by defendant railroad, but disallowing recovery for overhead of firefighting program); United States v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Ry. Co., 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1942) (reversing dismissal of suit against negligent railroad to recover costs
for fire suppression in national forest); and United States v. Ill. Terminal R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(denying railroad’s motion to dismiss suit by government to recover costs for removal of abandonded bridge piers).
176
In note 5 Lytton cites: City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A., Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d. 882 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(dismissing city’s and civic organizations’ negligence and public nuisance claims against gun manufacturer for
expenses incurred as a result of gun violence), aff’d on other grounds, 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002); Ganim v. Smith
& Wesson Corp., 26 Conn. L. Rptr. 39 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), aff’d, 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001) (affirming
dismissal of public nuisance suit by mayor and city against gun manufacturers and distributors for costs incurred
related to gun violence); Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (dismissing with
prejudice suit of Miami-Dade County against gun manufacturers to recover costs of emergency services provided in
response to gun violence); and City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) P15, 880 (Oh. Ct.
App. 2000) (affirming dismissal of city’s lawsuit to recover from gun distributor and manufacturers the costs of
emergency services arising from gun violence).
173
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hoistings of those who don’t evacuate, government rescue is at least as much a response to
individual misfortune as to corporate tort.
Perhaps FPSD opponents believe that courts only invoke FPSD in suits filed by
governments against large, financially solvent corporations for recoupment of rescue costs. Such
a belief would be untrue. Governmental entities rarely attempt to recoup the cost of services
from individual tortfeasors, both because of limits on solvency and because of reluctance to sue
one's voters in tort, but this political reality does not affect the content of the underlying tort
doctrine. A solvent (i.e., insured) individual’s negligence can certainly result in the expenditure
of thousands or even millions of dollars of public rescue services. In 1987 a small Texas town
spared no expense to save a child who had fallen down an abandoned well because of negligent
parental supervision – and there was no evidence that the parents were unable to pay for her
rescue, though no reimbursement was sought.177 Nor is it clear that those who stand behind
individual tortfeasors are incapable of indemnifying fire departments when careless smoking sets
their homes ablaze. In 2002, a federal forest service employee carelessly burned a letter at a
campground in a National Forest, resulting in $52 million in losses; her wealthy government
employer could have reimbursed local firefighters under respondeat superior.178 The apocryphal
insured motorist who negligently caused an accident on the George Washington Bridge during
rush hour may have enough coverage to pay for the huge outlay of state police overtime services
to re-route traffic. But of course, motorists are never sued by governments to recoup these
177

The mother and aunt of Jessica McClure, who fell down a well in her aunt’s backyard in Midland, Texas in 1987,
were determined by the state human services agency to have been negligently supervising the girl at the time of the
accident. Associated Press, Report Criticizes 2 Relatives in Child’s Fall in Texas Well, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1988,
at A18. If the McClure family did not at the time have sufficient resources to pay for the rescue services received, it
certainly did after the event was over. A $1 million trust fund was formed for Jessica’s benefit from donations
received from people around the world who learned of her ordeal in the media. Chip Brown, “Baby Jessica” Adapts
to Living Normal Life as a First-Grader, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1992, at A1.
178
Howard Pankratz, Government May Be Liable: Federal Worker’s Role in Fire Opens Legal Avenues, Experts
Say, DENVER POST, June 18, 2002, at A6.
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expenses – correctly, because recoupment suits have no basis in tort law. FPSD opponents never
explain why tort law should treat corporations differently.
One possible distinction between corporate and individual demands on services is that it
would be "inefficient" to encourage small recoupment claims against individuals, and that for
this reason only significant corporate wrongdoing should set off an exception to FPSD. But
Lytton himself points out that governments have occasionally launched (unsuccessful) tort suits
to recoup small sums from corporations.179 In 1986 Pittsburgh sued Equitable Gas Company for
$1,185.70 in public expenditures following a natural gas explosion.180 In 1987 the Township of
Cherry Hill, New Jersey, sued Conti Construction in a vain effort to recover $4,220.80, the
estimated cost of police overtime pay to evacuate a neighborhood after a Conti employee
negligently ruptured a gas line.181 In 1984, the State of New York unsuccessfully sued the Long
Island Lighting Company for $5,263.18 in expenses incurred to divert traffic from a stretch of
road onto which power lines had negligently been allowed to fall.182 Governments arguably
chose to sue corporations, as opposed to individual citizens, for small sums, for political reasons,
not for efficiency reasons.
Are these small-scale lawsuits rational? Why would New York State, Pittsburgh, or
Cherry Hill take a company to court to recover a small amount of money, surely less money than
it costs to file and prosecute the claims? In addition to the obvious “public choice” explanation
for this phenomenon,183 two other possible justifications for these suits come to mind. Perhaps
local and state governments have an “all shoplifters will be prosecuted” policy; that is, perhaps
179

All three cases discussed here are cited by Lytton, supra note 10 at 729 n.2.
City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., 512 A.2d 83, 84 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
181
Township of Cherry Hill v. Conti Construction Co., 527 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)
182
New York v. Long Island Lighting Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. Nassau Co. Ct. 1985)
183
Companies can't vote; company money is "new money" brought into government coffers, and replaces individual
tax dollars, thereby allowing for a lessened tax load on those who do vote.
180
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they try to take all public-service-incurring tortfeasors to court, no matter the value of the claim,
as a deterrent to negligent action causing governmental loss. Alternatively, government entities
may be attempting to make an example out of a particular defendant, perhaps because prior
unsatisfactory behavior has demonstrated that the company in question is a "bad apple." But
neither of these possible justifications can be easily reconciled with the fact that governments'
tort lawyers seemingly ignore claims on their resources by individual tortfeasors, many of whom
are surely known to be generally bad citizens.
Another argument distinguishing individual from corporate beneficiaries of public
services is that the former create problems the state is meant to resolve, while the latter cause
exceptional harm that goes beyond the legitimate scope of free public services. McIntyre writes:
[A]s a practical matter it would not be cost-effective for a government entity to entangle
itself in an expensive lawsuit for the relatively small costs incurred in responding to
minor emergencies such as car crashes and small home fires that are not properly
characterized as disasters.184
Under this rationale, corporations are “different” from physical persons, and deserve
distinctive tort treatment, essentially because they are not citizens. Judgments from New Jersey
and Massachusetts have alluded to an alleged public policy rationale behind spreading the risk of
emergency services away from individual persons: “[I]t would be too burdensome to charge all
who carelessly cause or fail to prevent fires with the injuries suffered by the expert retained with
public funds to deal with those inevitable, although negligently created, occurrences.”185 In
essence, this argument is that "efficiency" requires collective sharing of losses caused by
individuals, not corporations. This reinforces the impression that those who defend municipal-

184

McIntyre, supra note 10, at 1018 n.102.
Township of Cherry Hill, 527 A.2d at 922 (quoting Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J. 270, 274 (1960)). This quotation
was also cited in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 352, at *33.
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cost recovery suits are more concerned with transferring resources from corporations to
governments than with the theory of FPSD itself.
This preoccupation with corporate liability leads Lytton to argue that FPSD “unjustifiably
favors [corporate] tortfeasors who harm government as compared to those who harm private
parties.”186 If a corporation negligently damages a private party’s property through, e.g., an oil
spill, the corporation will be held liable in tort for the damage caused to that party.187 But if the
same negligent corporate act “harms” the government by "requiring" it to expend money to
deploy emergency equipment and cleanup crews to the private party's home, the corporation is
not liable to the government, a result Lytton believes is unfair and irrational.188 The mistake here
should be obvious, however. The harm the individual suffers in Lytton’s first example is direct,
not mediated as is the public service expense in helping clean up the individual's property.
Lytton concedes that directly harmed public property will also be indemnified in tort: if the
negligent oil spill pollutes City Hall, the city will recover damages from the spiller under current
tort law.189 No discrimination in favor of corporations is involved here. The "problem" here is
not FPSD – it is tort law's proximate causation requirement, and as shown above, it is a nonproblem.
Instead of comparing the potential liability of a corporate tortfeasor that has directly
harmed a private plaintiff with a corporate tortfeasor that has indirectly “harmed” government, a
logical study would compare the fate of a corporate tortfeasor that has indirectly “harmed”
government with an individual tortfeasor who has similarly indirectly “harmed” government.
Under the anti-FPSD rationale employed by the New Jersey Superior Court in James v. Arms
186

Lytton, supra note 10, at 759.
Id.
188
At least the corporation would not be liable for the emergency costs. Lytton acknowledges that negligent
tortfeasors may be required to repay governments for damage to real or chattel property. Id. at 743.
189
Id. at 743.
187
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Tech.,190 a chemical company whose plant explodes due to its negligence should be liable for the
costs of deployment of the municipal fire department to extinguish the blaze.191 Yet a negligent
homeowner who requires the services of the same fire department after falling asleep while
smoking is not liable for firefighting costs.192 Yet, to paraphrase the court, given the existence of
a "repeated course of conduct on [the part of smokers], requiring [a municipality] to expend
substantial governmental funds on a continuous basis," why the disparity?193
The cost incurred by a municipality in extinguishing a given fire is not a function of the
corporate status of the fire-setter.

As noted above, it might not be cost-effective for the

government to attempt to recover from every homeowner. But governments regularly devote
considerable resources to the profitable collection of small sums of money (such as traffic fines)
from individuals. In the aggregate, small, routine rescues of individuals, such as sending out fire
trucks for negligently caused automobile accidents, may well absorb the lion’s share of a fire
company’s budget.194 Imagine that a homeowner negligently allows natural gas to leak into his
home, resulting in an explosion that causes neighboring houses to catch fire. This homeowner
would be liable to his neighbors under current tort doctrine,195 yet would not be pursued by the
190

James v. Arms Tech., Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. 2003).
Lytton states: “Getting rid of the doctrine would allow government entities to recover from tortfeasors the costs
of services such as fire suppression, environmental cleanup, and rescue operations.” Lytton, supra note 10, at 768.
192
As Lytton believes that eliminating the free public services doctrine with regard to corporations “would not open
the door to unlimited liability or unleash a flood of claims” (id. at 750), he presumably envisions allowing only
government suits to recover the costs of the relatively large emergency expenditures typically caused by
corporations, rather than the more numerous lesser costs of services provided to negligent individuals.
193
James, 820 A.2d at 48-49.
194
Consider the experience of park rangers in Yosemite National Park. While rescuing mountain climbers is quite
costly due to the equipment and training required, the number of such rescues is only about 15 percent of the total
number of rescues each year. The vast majority of search and rescue missions are for lost hikers, a comparatively
cheap task per rescue. According to a ranger, “Climber rescues are more expensive because of helicopters, but we
do spend more money on rescuing hikers.” See Clare Noonan, Rescuing Climbers Raises Questions of Who Should
Pay, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 21, 2002, at C-7.
195
But see Ryan v. N.Y. Central R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 211 (1866) (stating that the party negligently causing a fire
is liable for damage only to the closest building to which the fire spreads, not all buildings that may be damaged);
and Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Kerr, 62 Pa. 352 (1870) (holding a railroad may be liable for fire damage directly
caused by sparks from a passing train, but that additional damage resulting from the fire spreading from building to
191
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municipality for the costs of extinguishing the blaze.196 Is this "unfair"? Opponents of FPSD
don't seem to think so. Why is there unfairness when the tortfeasor is a corporation?
Stripped of anti-corporate bias, the real question is whether it is unjust that a tortfeasor is
held liable for direct but not for mediated damages.

Should there be a point at which

corporations and individuals should be liable for expenditures by a fire department, perhaps if an
unusually large number of firefighters (as compared to the number required to douse an
“average” fire) must respond to a call? Should it matter that a government provides these
services, as a service (not a subsidy) to all (corporate and individual) legitimate197 stakeholders
in society? An anarcho-capitalistic argument could of course be made for eliminating
government services,198 but FPSD opponents do not seem motivated by anarcho-capitalist
theories.

B.

Flawed Distributional Claims

FPSD opponents seem to feel that the doctrine unfairly acts as liability insurance for
corporations, insurance for which “industry tends to get far more risk reduction and pay

building was not recoverable). The Supreme Court noted in Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474
(1876), that Ryan and Kerr “have been the subject of much criticism since they were decided” and that the rule they
stood for had not been widely accepted.
196
Negligently caused forest fires may be an exception to this trend in that individuals, as well as companies, are
apparently sometimes billed or sued for reimbursement for fire-suppression expenses. Ted Cilwick, Cost of
Fighting Fires in Wild Sparks Bills for Reimbursement, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1990, at A5.
197
Though most agree that the government should provide services to citizens, many feel that these services should
not be extended to illegal immigrants. An example of this sentiment is California Proposition 187, passed in 1994.
The proposition demanded that the state withhold many social services, including public education and emergency
room care, from illegal immigrants. Though the proposition passed by almost a 2-1 margin, federal courts restrained
implementation. Gregorio T. By and Through Jose T. v. Wilson, 59 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 1995). A recently-passed
Georgia law had been compared to California Proposition 187. See Rick Lyman, Georgia Immigration Law Broad,
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 14, 2006, at A3 (describing the recently-passed law that will take effect on July 1, 2007,
and that will deny state benefits, including welfare and Medicaid, to those who cannot prove they are in the country
legally).
198
See, generally, DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM: A GUIDE TO RADICAL CAPITALISM (Open
Court 1989); MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, FOR A NEW LIBERTY: THE LIBERTARIAN MANIFESTO (Collier 1978).
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proportionally less for . . . than [do] average citizens.”199 Lytton calls this system “distributively
unfair”200 and claims -- without referring to data to support his position -- that “citizens are crosssubsidizing [sic] industry.”201 The alleged subsidization occurs because corporate taxes are not
experience-rated: i.e., there is no direct relationship between the taxes paid by corporations and
risks created by these corporations.202
Lytton does concede, in passing, that corporations are required to finance, through
corporate and property taxes, public services from which they are intrinsically unable to benefit - such as public education and welfare benefits. But he dismisses these instances of industry-toindividual “subsidization” as unworthy of his attention, because they are “products of legislative
decisions, not tort subsidies created by common law judges.”203 Though this type of "subsidy"
“may be just as distributively unfair as the free public services doctrine’s cross-subsidization of
industry by citizens,” Lytton opines that the legislature’s blessing bestows upon these forced
subsidies “a level of democratic legitimacy.”204
Like other taxpayers, corporations pay income taxes used in part for transfer payments.
Corporations pay property taxes that fund municipal services to individuals.205 Corporations pay
other taxes for which they directly recoup little, such as Social Security and unemployment
199

Lytton, supra note 10, at 764.
Id.
201
Id.
202
Obviously, if a municipality's expenses rose greatly because of an accident, a hike in taxes might be required, and
if a corporation pays a significant percentage of the municipality's taxes that corporation will bear the costs of this
tax increase. But the municipality will not be allowed to increase the taxes of the corporation alone. Allowing a
discriminatory tax hike is, in essence, the gist of Lytton's proposal.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 765.
205
Corporations pay property taxes even though these are considered to be mostly “benefits based,” that is, the
benefits received by the taxpayer in exchange for taxes paid are allegedly relatively closely related. See HERBERT
KIESLING, TAXATION AND PUBLIC GOODS: A WELFARE-ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF TAX POLICY ANALYSIS 182
(University of Michigan 1992). Property taxes are often the single-largest source of revenue for cities. This is so,
for example, for New York City, which received 40% of its budget from property taxes in fiscal year 2002. CITY OF
N.Y. DEP’T OF FINANCE OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, ANNUAL REPORT ON EXPENDITURES FY 2002 at 5, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dof/pdf/01pdf/taxexpend_02.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2004).
200
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levies. Indeed, corporations are believed to generate, directly and indirectly, so many positive
tax externalities that local governments compete to entice them to relocate to their communities.
Municipal "tax holidays" are circumstantial corroboration that corporations provide net positive
tax externalities ex ante.206
Tellingly, in a footnote Lytton makes an important concession that undermines his
argument that FPSD is illegitimate corporate welfare. He writes:
Empirical data comparing public expenditures occasioned by industry to public
expenditures occasioned by individuals is unavailable.

Thus, claims of cross-

subsidization are admittedly speculative. Such claims are, however, not unlikely given
the relatively higher risk posed by industrial accidents when compared to accidents
caused by individuals.207
It turns out that the “subsidization” claim is based on social costs (the cost of industrial
accidents), but not on social benefits (the positive neighborhood effects attributable to the
corporation) that result from the operation of a company. "Speculating" that FPSD results in a
net subsidy to corporations, without looking at the benefits of the corporate form, is academic
“junk social science.”208

C.

Flawed Allocative Claim

206

See, e.g., Peralte C. Paul, Big Push Won DaimlerChrysler, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 20, 2002, at 1F; Peter
Behr, To Lure Jobs, States Surrender Key Tax Returns, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at A1; Elizabeth Levitan Spaid,
States in No-Holds-Barred Battle to Attract New Jobs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 31, 1995, at 3.
207
See Lytton, supra note 10, at 764 n.177 (emphasis added).
208
Under the standard of evidence laid out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, “in order to qualify as
‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.” 509 U.S. 579, 590
(1993). The factors used by a court to determine if evidence is admissible as scientific or technical knowledge
include whether the knowledge has been or can be tested, whether the methodology at issue has been subject to peer
review and publication, and whether the technique used to acquire the knowledge is generally accepted. Id. at 59394. Lytton’s discussion on subsidization would not pass such a test.
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The distributive argument for revocation of FPSD is speculative.

Not to worry, for

FPSD critics are capable of changing tack completely to promote corporate liability for public
services as efficient “loss-spreading,” unlike municipal taxation, which constitutes inefficient,
compulsory insurance.209 Lytton writes:
[W]hen government passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not free to opt
out of the insurance scheme. As long as government finances public services, the free
public services doctrine will compel taxpayers to participate in a loss-spreading scheme
that insures against liability for the cost of public services.210
There are two problems with this poor imitiation of Judge Posner. First, it impliedly
excludes corporations from the category of “taxpayers.”

As noted, such an exclusion is

groundless since there is no data supporting the contention that corporate taxpayers are not
similarly or even more acutely impoverished by the coercive “group insurance” of publicly
financed services. Secondly, without full fee-for-service privatization of all social services,
which FPSD critics neither advocate nor support, some will always pay more, or less, than a “fair
share” for public services.211 It is of the essence of a tax that its payment be coercive. It can be
argued that a corporate citizen that has never suffered an accidental fire, explosion, chemical
spill, or other large-scale disaster is "inefficiently" subsidizing paramedic, fire, and police
insurance for the small minority of individuals who consume the majority of EMTs', fire
departments' and police forces' time – but such an argument would be specious, because it is
unclear what "inefficiently" means in this context. Why is payment of “forced insurance” by
corporations not "inefficient" to FPSD opponents? They do not provide any theory of efficiency

209

Lytton, supra note 10, at 763.
Id. at 764.
211
Even privatized and fully competitive insurance markets will result in unequal distribution of costs and benefits
ex post, though of course not ex ante if premiums are actuarially set.
210
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or of politics that would explain why a net payment in one direction, but not in the other, is
"inefficient." Nor do they ever discuss the communitarian premises which arguably underly the
notion of public services. Communitarian ideals might in fact compel general payment of
“natural monopoly” public goods, trumping any efficiency claim.212 Is it "inefficient" for the
majority to pay for police protection of an embattled minority that frequently needs police
protection, yet doesn't pay its "fair share"?

Without discussion of such issues as "equal

protection", "due process" and "republican form of government", arguments against FPSD on
grounds of efficient insurance are whistles in the dark.

D.
Voluntary Products Liability "Insurance" vs. Involuntary Public
Services "Insurance"
Noting that “[l]oss spreading elsewhere in the law of torts involves voluntary
participation of those in the risk pool,”213 FPSD opponents contrast the “voluntary” insurance
scheme resulting from corporate liability for defective products with the “involuntary” lossspreading required by payment of public services through taxes. For example, Lytton asserts that
under products liability, “the cost of purchasing the insurance is included in the price of the
product."214

This makes the insurance "voluntary."

"By contrast," Lytton claims, "when

government passes public service costs on to taxpayers, they are not free to opt out of the
insurance scheme.”215
This comparison misunderstands not only the nature of public services, but also the
insurance element of products liability law, which is "voluntary" in a most unusual way.

212

See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 137, at 320-23 (noting that allowing individuals in a community to opt out of
“equal sharing” of the restrictions and burdens of the community might change the character of the community).
213
Lytton, supra note 10, at 763.
214
Id. at 764.
215
Id.
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Consumers may not currently give up their rights to sue manufacturers in products liability in
exchange for lower prices; they may “opt out” of products liability “insurance” only by refusing
to buy the products themselves – a virtual impossibility for some goods and a very inefficient
bundling for most others.216 Similarly, producers may opt out of product liability law only by
ceasing to produce, not by offering less insurance at a lower price. In addition, when products
are purchased, all purchasers pay the same “insurance premium” as a component of the product
price, regardless of the individual risk created by each consumer's particular use of the
product.217 This is the same “coercion” and "cross-subsidization" (sic) that Lytton believes is
unjustly generated by FPSD. But the same bundling exists for public services. Taxpayers can
decide to fund more or less services through tax dollars, or they can refuse to fund them at all
(providing for them in the private market); or they can move to another jurisdiction with
different tax preferences; or they can decline to earn income (avoiding income tax) or purchase
goods (avoiding sales tax). In neither product liability law nor public finance is there a “clean”
insurance market with individually determined and agreed-upon premiums for specific risks. In
the end, the “involuntary” nature of FPSD matters if (and only if) public provision of rescue
services is itself fundamentally unjust.218
FPSD opponents declare that the doctrine is an inefficient way to provide insurance, and
that “[e]liminating the doctrine would encourage most high-risk entities to purchase private

216

See Michael I. Krauss, Product Liability and Game Theory: One More Trip to the Choice-of-Law Well, [2002]
B.Y.U. L. Rev. 759 at 802-15.
217
Some consumers use their ladders daily, others only once a year. Additionally, some users are risk-averse while
others are reckless. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88-92 (1972) (discussing
relation of liability rules to level of care exercised by consumers).
218
Lytton's argument about corporations not paying their “fair share” for rescue services becomes even less
intelligible when one considers that corporations do not actually “pay” taxes. In fact, the cost of corporate taxes is
passed on to employees, in the form of lower wages, or corporate shareholders, in the form of lower dividends. See,
e.g., MARIAN KRZYZANIAK & RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE SHIFTING OF THE CORPORATION INCOME TAX (1963).
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insurance.”219 This implies that companies do not currently purchase "enough" insurance,
because they expect FPSD to protect them from liability in the event of a negligently-caused
disaster. As a matter of fact, insurance coverage is specifically mentioned in several of the cases
cited by FPSD opponents. For example, after the oil tanker Cadiz ran aground in 1978, Amoco’s
insurance company told the French government that it could not on its own handle the cleanup of
such a large oil spill, but that the company would reimburse France for “reasonable costs”
incurred by France in the cleanup on Amoco’s behalf.220 Following the terms of an international
convention on pollution damage to which France was a party, Amoco paid the maximum
recovery amount for such incidents -- 77 million Francs (about $16 million) -- into a fund for the
French government to apply toward cleanup costs.221 The French government, however, thought
this sum insufficient and sued (in American courts, bien sûr) to obtain additional funds.222 It is
hard to see why it should be assumed that Amoco was “underinsured” when the company made
arrangements to pay the statutory maximum allowed for such a disaster.

If the statutory

maximum was insufficient, that cap -- not tort law’s free public services doctrine -- needs to be
changed.
Insurance coverage was also an issue in Fontenot.223 The two corporations involved in
the explosion and fire “stipulated liability, not to exceed the limits of liability in the applicable
insurance policies.”224 Although defendants had policies at various coverage levels with five
different insurance companies, the city chose to sue only the two firms from which the insureds

219

Lytton, supra note 10, at 766.
In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 954 F.2d 1279, 1310 (7th Cir. 1992).
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Morgan City v. Fontenot, 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1984)
224
Id. at 686.
220
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had purchased “excess coverage.”225 The court explained the move this way: “Apparently, the
limits of liability of the other insurers had been expended in satisfaction of other claims.”226 If
that was the case, it can hardly be argued that the defendants had inadequate insurance; after all,
they had not themselves exhausted the limits of liability on all of their policies. Rather, the city
seemed to want to convert the insured's “excess coverage” into social insurance, so long as the
money came from an outside insurer and not a local firm.

V. Conclusion
FPSD opponents maintain that the free public services doctrine "does not have
particularly deep roots in the common law, dating back only to the 1970s.”227 As this article has
demonstrated, FPSD is in fact an ancient doctrine What opponents see as “antecedents” to FPSD
-- cases involving unsuccessful tort claims against criminals for the cost of their capture and
imprisonment,228 or failed suits by the federal government to recover economic losses resulting
from injury by a tortfeasor to soldiers,229 -- are in fact nothing but particular applications of duty,
proximate cause and economic harm theories.
This article has situated FPSD as a sound and timeless application of existing common
law doctrines. Those who oppose FPSD resort to “policy analysis” motivated by an inchoate and
uninformed bias against corporations. Their claim that FPSD “inefficiently externalizes the costs
of tortfeasors’ wrongdoing”230 fails, as does their assertion that the doctrine is “distributively
unfair.”231 Their conclusion that “[a]bandoning the doctrine would end an undesirable tort
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subsidy to careless industries and place an appropriate limit on judicial loss spreading . . .”232 is
untenable.233
This article also defended FPSD from the unjust accusation that it represents "judicial
activism." Critics fail to explain why judges’ application of traditional common law doctrines of
duty and proximate causation is "activism," while judicial overthrow of these doctrines on
unproven "policy" grounds and in the name of an inchoate "efficiency" would not be activism.
In fact, such a dramatic upheaval would be aberrant for the common law. Common law judges
examine the issues before them in a case with no pre-conceived ideas about launching policy
“reform” efforts when the right case comes along.234
The free public services doctrine is a brick mortared to the walls of the Proximate
Causation, Duty and Economic Loss rules. Its critics fail to see the doctrine's intrinsic link to the
common law of tort. The failings of their arguments give us reason to applaud, not to condemn,
the free public services doctrine.
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